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Abstract:  
This paper employs a multi-country large scale Overlapping Generations model with 
uninsurable labor productivity and mortality risk to quantify the impact of the demographic 
transition towards an older population in industrialized countries on world-wide rates of 
return, international capital flows and the distribution of wealth and welfare in the OECD. We 
find that for the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis 
points between 2005 and 2080 and wages increase by about 4.1%. If the U.S. were a closed 
economy, rates of return would decline and wages increase by less. This is due to the fact that 
other regions in the OECD will age even more rapidly; therefore the U.S. is “importing” the 
more severe demographic transition from the rest of the OECD in the form of larger factor 
price changes. In terms of welfare, our model suggests that young agents with little assets and 
currently low labor productivity gain, up to 1% in consumption, from higher wages associated 
with population aging. Older, asset-rich households tend to lose, because of the predicted 
decline in real returns to capital. 
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In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, over time reducing
the fraction of the population in working age. This process is driven by falling
mortality rates followed by a decline in birth rates, which reduces population
growth rates (and even turn them negative in some countries). While demo-
graphic change occurs in all countries in the world, extent and timing di¤er
substantially. Europe and some Asian countries have almost passed the closing
stages of the demographic transition process while Latin America and Africa
are only at the beginning (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; United Nations, 2002).
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Population Growth Rate in 4 Regions
Figure 1, based on UN population projections, illustrates the di¤erential
impact of demographic change on population growth rates (de…ned here as the
growth rate of the adult population) for the period 2000-2080 for four regions of
the world that comprise the entire world: the U.S., the European Union (EU),
the rest of the OECD (ROECD) and the rest of the world (ROW). Population
growth rates are predicted to decline in all regions, but are positive in the U.S.
and in the ROW region throughout the 21st century, whereas they fall below zero
in the EU in about 2016 and in the ROECD in about 2042. As a consequence,
the population in the EU (the ROECD) starts shrinking in about 2016 (2042),
2whereas the population in the other two regions continues to increase.
Figure 2 shows the impact of demographic change on working-age population
ratios - the ratio of the working-age population (of age 20-64) to the total adult
population (of age 20-95). This indicator, which will turn out to be crucial
in our analysis, illustrates that the EU is the oldest, whereas the ROW is the
youngest region in terms of the relative size of the working-age population.
The United States and the rest of the OECD region initially have the same
level of working-age population ratios, but the dynamics of demographic change
di¤er substantially in the U.S. relative to the other regions. While working-
age population ratios decrease across all regions, the speed of this decrease
signi…cantly slows down for the U.S. in about 2030.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Working Age to Population Ratios in 4 Regions
What are the welfare consequences of living in a world where the population
is aging rapidly? First, individuals live longer lives and tend to have fewer
children, which are the underlying reasons of aging populations. The welfare
e¤ects of these changes are hard to quantify. Second, due to changes in the
population structure, aggregate labor supply and aggregate savings is bound to
change, with ensuing changes in factor prices for labor and capital. Speci…cally,
labor is expected to be scarce, relative to capital, with an ensuing increase in
real wages and decline in the real return on capital. The primary objective of
this paper is to quantify the distributional and welfare consequences from this
3second, general equilibrium e¤ect of the demographic changes around the world.
To this end, we use demographic projections from the United Nations, to-
gether with a large scale Overlapping Generations Model pioneered by Auerbach
and Kotliko¤ (1987). We extend the model to a multi-country version, as in
Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), among many others, and also enrich the model by
uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty, as in Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Imro-
horoglu et al. (1999), Conesa and Krueger (1999) and others. Both extensions
are necessary for the question we want to address. First, uninsurable idio-
syncratic uncertainty will endogenously give rise to some agents deriving most
of their income from returns to capital, while the income of others is mainly
composed of labor income. Abstracting from this heterogeneity does not allow
a meaningful analysis of the distributional consequences of changes in factor
prices. This feature also adds a precautionary savings motive to the standard
life-cycle savings motive of households, which makes life cycle savings pro…les
generated by the model more realistic. Second, in light of potential di¤erences
in the evolution of the age distribution of households across regions, it is impor-
tant to allow for capital to ‡ow across regions. In our model capital can freely
‡ow between di¤erent regions in the OECD (the U.S., the EU and the rest of the
OECD). These capital ‡ows may mitigate the decline in rates of return and the
increase in real wages one would expect in the U.S. if it were a closed economy.
We …nd exactly the opposite. In the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return
are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080: If the U.S.
were a closed economy, this decline would amount to only 79 basis points. This
result is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more
rapidly. Therefore the U.S. is “importing” the more severe aging problem from
these regions via a stronger increase in wages and a stronger decline in interest
rates, relative to being a closed economy.
In order to evaluate the welfare consequences of the demographic transition
we ask the following question: suppose a household economically born in 2005
would live through the economic transition with changing factor prices induced
by the demographic change (but keeping its own survival probabilities constant
at their 2005 values), how would its welfare have changed, relative to a situation
without a demographic transition? We …nd that for young households with little
assets the increase in wages dominates the decline in rates of return. Abstracting
from social security and its reform newborns in 2005 gain in the order of 0.6-0.9%
in terms of lifetime consumption. Older, asset-rich individuals, on the other
hand, tend to lose because of the decline in interest rates. If the demographic
transition, in addition, makes a reform of the social security system necessary,
then falling bene…ts or increasing taxes reduce the welfare gains for newborn
agents. An increase in the retirement age to 70, on the other hand, mitigates
some of these negative consequences.
Our paper borrows model elements from, and contributes to, three strands
of the literature. Starting with Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) a vast number
of papers has used large-scale OLG models to analyze the transition path of an
economy induced by a policy reform. Examples include social security reform
(see e.g. Conesa and Krueger (1999)), fundamental tax reform (see e.g. Altig
4et al. (2001), Conesa and Krueger (2005)) and many others.
A second strand of the literature (often using the general methodology of
the …rst strand) has focused on the economic consequences of population aging
in closed economies, often paying special attention to the adjustments required
in the social security system due to demographic shifts. Important examples
include Huang et al. (1997), De Nardi et al. (1999), and, with respect to asset
prices, Abel (2003).
The contributions discussed so far assume that the economy under investi-
gation is closed to international capital ‡ows. However, as the population ages
at di¤erent pace in various regions of the world one would expect capital to ‡ow
across these regions. The third strand of the literature our paper touches upon
therefore is the large body of work in international macroeconomics studying the
direction, size, cause and consequences of international capital ‡ows and current
account dynamics, reviewed comprehensively in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995).
Our paper is most closely related to work that combines these three strands of
the literature, by using the methodology of large scale OLG models to study the
consequences of demographic change in open economies. The work by Attanasio
et al. (2006b) constructs a two region (the North and the South) OLG model to
study the allocative and welfare consequences of di¤erent social security reforms
in an open economy. Compared to their model, we include endogenous labor
supply and idiosyncratic income shocks. While we also have to take a stand
on how the social security system deals with the aging of the population, these
social security reforms are not in the center of our analysis whereas their paper
focuses on this issue. In Attanasio et al. (2006a) the authors quantify the direct
welfare losses from demographic changes for the South region of their model,
carrying out a similar thought experiment we do for the U.S..
Similar to Attanasio et al. (2006b), but with a stronger focus on Europe or
the OECD, Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) and Fehr et al. (2005) investigate the
impact of population aging on the viability of the social security system and
its reform. Building on earlier work by Brooks (2003) who employs a simple
four period OLG model, Henriksen (2002), Feroli (2003) and Domeij and Floden
(2005) use large scale simulation models similar to Börsch-Supan et al. (2006)
to explain historical capital ‡ow data with changes in demographics, rather
than, as we do, to study the (welfare and distributional) implications of future
changes in demographics. Relative to this literature, we see the contribution of
our paper in evaluating the welfare consequences of the demographic transition
per se and not just the alternative social security reform scenarios, as well as in
the analysis of the distributional consequences of changing factor prices due to
population aging.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we construct a simple,
analytically tractable multi-country OLG model to isolate the key determinants
of international capital ‡ows and the impact of changes in the demographic
structure on rates of return and capital ‡ows. Section 3 contains the descrip-
tion of our large scale simulation model. Section 4 discusses the calibration of
the model and section 5 presents results for the benchmark model. In section 6
we compare our results to what would be obtained in a closed economy model.
5There we also disentangle the e¤ects from changing fertility and mortality. Sec-
tion 7 concludes, and separate appendices contain more detailed information
about the demographic model underlying our simulations, as well as details of
the computational strategy and calibration of the model.
2 A Simple Model
We now construct a simple OLG model that is a special case of our quantitative
model in the next section. We can characterize equilibria in this model ana-
lytically, and are especially interested in the in‡uence of demographic variables
and the size of the social security system on rates of return to capital and the
dynamics of international capital ‡ows. The results of this simple model will
provide some intuition for the quantitative results from the simulation model.
In every country i there are Nt;i young households who live for two periods
and have preferences over consumption c
y
t;i;co
t+1;i representable by the utility
function
log(c
y
t;i) + ¯ log(c
o
t+1;i):
In the …rst period of their lives households work for a wage wt;i; and in the
second period they retire and receive social security bene…ts bt+1;i, …nanced via
payroll taxes on labor income. Thus the budget constraints read as
c
y
t + st = (1 ¡ ¿t;i)wt;i
c
o
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + bt+1;i
where rt+1 is the real interest rate between period t and t + 1 and ¿t;i is the
social security tax rate in country i: We assume that capital ‡ows freely across
countries, and thus the real interest rate is equalized across the world.
The production function in each country is given by
Yt;i = K
®
t;i (ZiAtNt;i)
1¡® ;
where Zi is the country-speci…c technology level and At = (1+g)t is exogenously
growing productivity. Thus we allow for di¤erences in technology levels across
countries, but not its growth rate. We further assume that capital depreciates
fully after its use in production.
The production technology in each country is operated by a representative
…rm that behaves competitively in product and factor markets. Pro…t maxi-
mization of …rms therefore implies that
1 + rt = ®k
®¡1
t
wt;i = (1¡ ®)ZiAtk
®
t ; (1)
where
kt = kt;i =
Kt;i
ZiAtNt;i
8i
is the capital stock per e¢ciency unit of labor.
6We assume that the social security system is a pure pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
system that balances the budget in every period. Therefore
¿t;iwt;iNt;i = bt;iNt¡1;i:
Finally, market clearing in the world capital market requires that
Kt+1 =
X
i
Kt+1;i =
X
i
Nt;ist;i:
2.1 Analysis
Equilibria in this model can be characterized analytically. To do so we …rst
solve the household problem and then aggregate across households (countries).
2.1.1 Optimal Household Savings Behavior
Optimal saving of the young in country i are given as
st;i =
¯
1 + ¯
wt;i(1 ¡ ¿t;i) ¡
bt+1;i
(1 + ¯)(1 + rt+1)
: (2)
The budget constraint of the social security system implies that
bt;i =
Nt;i
Nt¡1;i
wt;i¿ t;i = °
N
t;iwt;i¿ t;i;
where °N
t;i is the gross growth rate of the young cohort in country i between
period t ¡ 1 and t: It also measures the working age to population ratio (the
higher is °N
t;i; the higher is that ratio)1, which allows us to map the predictions
of this model to the data plotted in …gure 2: Using the expression for bene…ts
and substituting out for wages and interest rates from (1) in (2) yields
st;i =
¯(1¡ ¿t;i)(1 ¡ ®)
1 + ¯
ZiAtk
®
t ¡
°N
t+1;i¿t+1;i(1 ¡ ®)
(1+ ¯)®
ZiAt+1kt+1: (3)
1The population of a country iat time t is given by
Popt;i = Nt;i +Nt¡1;i
and the working age to population ratio is given by
waprt;i =
Nt;i
Popt;i
:
Then we can easily compute the growth rate of the population as
°
Pop
t;i =
Popt+1;i
Popt;i
=
1+°N
t;i
1+ 1
°N
t¡1;i
:
In a balanced growth path °
Pop
i = °N
i and furthermore wapri = 1
1+ 1
°N
i
: Thus °N
i is ameasure
both of the population growth rate as well as the working age to population ratio.
72.1.2 Aggregation
For further reference, de…ne by ~ Nt =
P
i ZiNt;i the e¢ciency weighted world
population, by ~ µt;i =
ZiNt;i
~ Nt =
~ Nt;i
~ Nt the relative share of the e¢ciency-weighted
population in country i and by ~ °
N
t =
~ Nt
~ Nt¡1 =
P
i
~ µt;i°N
t;i the growth rate of the
aggregate (world) e¢ciency weighted population.
The capital market clearing condition reads
X
i
st;iNt;i =
X
i
Kt+1;i = kt+1
X
i
ZiAt+1Nt+1;i = kt+1At+1 ~ Nt+1 (4)
Aggregating household savings decisions across countries yields, from (3):
X
i
st;iNt;i =
(1 ¡ ®)¯Atk®
t
1 + ¯
X
i
(1¡¿t;i)ZiNt;i¡
(1¡ ®)At+1kt+1
(1 + ¯)®
X
i
ZiNt+1;i¿t+1;i
Using this in (4) and simplifying yields
kt+1 = ¾tk
®
t (5)
where
¾t =
®(1¡ ®)¯(1¡ ¿a
t)
~ °
N
t+1°A ¡
®(1+ ¯) + (1¡ ®)¿a
t+1
¢
is the fraction of output per e¤ective worker that is saved. Here ¿ a
t =
P
i ¿t;i~ µt;i
denotes the average social security contribution rate in the world and °A = 1+g
is the growth rate of technology. Equation (5); as a function of the policy and
demographic parameters of the model, describes the dynamics of the aggregate
capital stock, given the initial condition k0:2 Since, from the …rms’ …rst order
condition, interest rates are given by
1 + rt = ®k
®¡1
t
the dynamics of the real interest rate are given by
1 + rt+1 =
µ
®
¾t
¶1¡®
(1+ rt)
® (6)
with initial condition 1 + r0 = ®k
®¡1
0 :
2.1.3 Balanced Growth Path Analysis
A balanced growth path (BGP) is characterized by a constant e¤ective capital
stock k = ¾
1
1¡® where
¾ =
®(1 ¡ ®)¯(1 ¡ ¿ a)
~ °
N°A(®(1 + ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a)
2Explicitly, k0 =
?
i s¡1;iN¡1;i
A0
?
i ZiN0;i where s¡1;iN¡1;i denotes total assets held by the initial
old generation in country i:
8Evidently, normalized and productivity de-trended per capita output in country
i is then given by
Yt;i
ZiAt(Nt;i + Nt¡1;i)
=
¾
®
1¡® °N
i
1 + °N
i
: (7)
To gain further intuition it is instructive to relate rates of return to savings
rates along a BGP. World saving (equal to investment) is given by
St = Kt+1 ¡ Kt
and along a BGP capital grows at a constant rate °A~ °
N; so that
St = [°A~ °
N ¡ 1]Kt
Thus the world-wide saving (investment) rate along the BGP is given by
srt =
St
Yt
= [°A~ °N ¡ 1]
Kt
Yt
= [°A~ °N ¡ 1]
ktAt
P
i ZiNt;i
k®
t At
P
iZiNt;i
= [°A~ °N ¡ 1]k1¡® = [°A~ °N ¡ 1] ¤
®
1 + r
= sr
or
1 + r =
®[°A~ °
N ¡ 1]
sr
(8)
which shows that interest rates and savings rates are negatively related: ahigher
savings rate, ceteris paribus, increases the supply of capital and thus depresses
the rate of return. Of course both the interest rate and the world savings rate
are endogenous, and functions of the underlying parameters. It directly follows
that along the BGP
sr = [1 ¡ (~ °N°A)¡1]
®(1 ¡ ®)¯(1 ¡ ¿a)
(®(1+ ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a)
(9)
1 + r = °A~ °N (®(1 + ¯) + (1¡ ®)¿ a)
(1¡ ®)¯(1¡ ¿a)
(10)
Furthermore, we can characterize international capital ‡ows and the current
account. De…ne savings and investment rates as well as the current account (as
fraction of output) in country i as
srt;i =
At+1;i ¡ At;i
Yt;i
irt;i =
Kt+1;i ¡ Kt;i
Yt;i
cat;i = srt;i ¡ irt;i
9Along a BGP we can determine, after some tedious algebra,
iri = [1 ¡ (°
A°
N
i )
¡1]
°N
i ®(1¡ ®)¯(1¡ ¿ a)
~ °N (®(1+ ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a)
(11)
sri = [1 ¡ (°A°N
i )¡1]
·
¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿i)
1 + ¯
¡
¯(1¡ ®)¿ i
(1+ ¯)
°N
i (1 ¡ ®)(1¡ ¿a)
~ °
N (®(1 + ¯) + (1¡ ®)¿ a)
¸
(12)
cai = [1 ¡ (°
A°
N
i )
¡1]
¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿i)
1+ ¯
·
1¡
°N
i (1 ¡ ¿a)(®(1+ ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿i)
~ °N(1 ¡ ¿i)(®(1+ ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a)
¸
(13)
Finally, net foreign asset positions and the current account in the BGP are
related according to
CAt;i = Ft+1;i ¡ Ft;i = [1¡ (°
A°
N
i )
¡1]Ft+1;i
cai =
CAt;i
Yt;i
= [1 ¡ (°A°N
i )¡1]fi where fi =
Ft+1;i
Yt;i
and thus
fi =
¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿i)
1+ ¯
·
1¡
°N
i (1 ¡ ¿a)(®(1+ ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿i)
~ °N(1 ¡ ¿i)(®(1+ ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¿a)
¸
(14)
2.2 Qualitative Predictions from the Simple Model
In this section we illustrate, using equations (8)-(14), how an aging population
(as captured by a decline in ~ °
N), or an increase in social security contribu-
tion rates induced by demographic changes (as captured by an increase in ¿)
a¤ects world-wide rates of return, country-speci…c per capita output, savings
and investment rates as well as the current account and the net foreign asset
position.
2.2.1 Rates of Return
First we determine the consequences of a decline in the working age to popu-
lation ratio in the BGP. From equation (10) we immediately see that despite
the fact that the interest rate and the savings rate are negatively related (see
equation (8)), a decline in the working age to population ratio ~ °N leads to both
a decline in the rate of return r and in the saving rate sr: What is the intu-
ition? A reduction of ~ °N reduces the number of young people relative to old
people. Since savings is only done by the young, the savings rate in the economy
declines. This makes capital scarce and, ceteris paribus, increases r (see equa-
tion 8). But there is the direct e¤ect on the interest rate r: a reduction of ~ °N
reduces labor supply tomorrow (as there are fewer young), making labor scarce
relative to capital. In the simple model of this section this e¤ect is theoretically
shown to dominate, and hence r falls.
10Equation (10) shows another potential, indirect e¤ect from population aging
on the interest rate that stems from the social security system. An increase in
the (world average) social security contribution rate ¿a; by reducing private
savings rates, is predicted to drive up rates of return. If policy makers want
to keep social security bene…ts stable despite an aging population, an increase
in contribution rates is required. Because this, ceteris paribus, drives up future
rates of return, the adjustment of ¿ a mitigates or even dominates the direct
e¤ect of population aging via a decline of ~ °N, as also highlighted by Fehr et al.
(2005).3
To summarize, a decline in the world-wide working age to population ratio
leads to a decline in rates of return to capital, as long as social security contribu-
tion rates are held constant (and thus bene…ts shrink). If, however, contribution
rates are raised in addition, to keep social security bene…ts stable, the predicted
decline in returns is smaller, or returns may even increase. Quantitative work is
needed to measure the relative strength of these e¤ects, something we will turn
to in the next sections of this paper.
2.2.2 Per Capita Output
The simple decomposition in equation (7) illustrates the various channels through
which demographic change a¤ects per capita output in country i. As the most
direct e¤ect, a decrease in the working age to population ratio in country i as
measured by °N
i leads to a decrease of the overall population which means that
the existing resources have to be shared by less people. However, the decrease of
the working age to population ratio also directly reduces the labor force which
suppresses overall output. An additional positive e¤ect on per capita output
stems from capital depending because decreasing °N
i ; through its e¤ect on ~ °N;
leads to an increase of ¾ and thereby to an increase of the long-run capital cap-
ital stock per e¢cient worker, k. Finally, an additional indirect e¤ect already
familiar from the above discussion on rates of return emanates from increases
in contribution rates, ¿ a, if social security bene…t levels were to be maintained.
This harms capital accumulation. Again, quantitative work is needed to mea-
sure the relative strengths of these various e¤ects.
2.2.3 Net Foreign Asset Positions
Finally we want to deduce the implications of the simple model for the cur-
rent account and net foreign asset positions across countries. First we observe
from equations (13) and (14) that if all countries are identical with respect to
their demographic structure and size of the social security system, then the cur-
rent account and the net foreign asset positions are equal to zero. Thus the
3The preceding analysis also holds outside thebalanced growth path, as equation (6)shows.
Since kt and hence rt is predetermined, we observe from equation (6) that the response of
rt+1 depends negatively on the world saving rate ¾t; which is itself a negative function of the
e¢ciency-weighted population growth rate ~ °N
t+1 between period t and t + 1 and a positive
function of the social security contribution rate ¿a
t+1. The same qualitative predictions as in
the BGP follow.
11only reason for capital to ‡ow across countries in our model are di¤erences in
demographics and in the size of the social security system.
What are the consequences of a reduction in the working age to population
ratio °N
i ; abstracting from social security (that is, setting ¿ i = ¿a = 0)?4 We
observe from equations (11) and (12) that both investment as well as savings
rates decline with a decrease in °N
i ; for the same reason as the world savings
rate decreased above. What happens to the current account and the net foreign
asset position of country i depends on whether it is aging faster or slower than
the rest of the world. If all countries age at the same speed (the ratio °N
i =~ °N
remains unchanged) then the net foreign asset position remains unchanged and
the current account declines in absolute value. If, on the other hand, country
i ages faster than the rest (°N
i =~ °
N decreases), then its net foreign asset posi-
tion and its current account increase: capital ‡ows from regions that are aging
faster to regions that are aging slower. Notice that the term °N
i =~ °
N appears
in equation (11) but not in equation (12) which illustrates that the strength
of demographic change in country i relative to the other world regions directly
a¤ects investment rates but not savings rates.
Finally, if all countries have identical working age topopulation ratios (°N
i =~ °
N
remains at 1), but country i increases its social security contribution rate ¿i then
(assuming for simplicity ¿a = 0) we observe from equations (11)-(14) that coun-
try i’s investment rate remains unchanged, its private savings rate sri declines,
and with it the current account and the net foreign asset position. We will later
use these qualitative predictions from the simple model to interpret our results
from the quantitative model to which we turn next.
3 The Quantitative Model
In this section we describe the quantitative model we use to evaluate the conse-
quences of demographic changes for international capital ‡ows, returns to capital
and wages, as well as the welfare consequences emanating from these changes.
In our quantitative work we consider three countries/regions: the United States
(U.S.), the European Union (EU) and the rest of the OECD (ROECD).
3.1 Demographics
The demographic evolution in our model is taken as exogenous (i.e. we do not
model fertility, mortality or migration) and is the main driving force of our
model. Households start their economic life at age 20; retire at age 65 and live
at most until age 95. Since we do not model childhood of a household explicitly,
we denote its twentieth year of life by j = 0; its retirement age by jr = 45 and
the terminal age of life by J = 75. Households face an idiosyncratic, time- and
country-dependent (conditional) probability to survive from age j to age j + 1;
which we denote by st;j;i:
4Most of these results can be shown under the less restrictive assumption that ¿i =¿ ® 6= 0:
12For each country i we have data or forecasts for populations of model age
j 2 f0;:::;75g in years 1950;:::;2300. From now on we denote year 1950 as
our base year t = 0 and year 2300 as the …nal period T and the demographic
data for periods t 2 f0;:::;Tg by Nt;j;i. For simplicity, we assume that all
migration takes place at or before age j = 0 in the model (age 20 in the data),
so that we can treat migrants and agents born inside the country of interest
symmetrically.
3.2 Technology
In each country the single consumption good is being produced according to a
standard neoclassical production function
Yt;i = ZiK®
t;i (AtLt;i)
1¡® ;
where Yt;i is output in country i at date t, Kt;i and Lt;i are capital and la-
bor inputs and At is total labor productivity, growing at a constant country
independent rate g. The scaling parameters Zi control relative total factor pro-
ductivities across countries, whereas the parameter ® measures the capital share
and is assumed to be constant over time and across countries. In each country
capital used in production depreciates at a common rate ±. Since production
takes place with a constant-returns to scale production function and since we
assume perfect competition, the number of …rms is indeterminate in equilib-
rium and, without loss of generality, we assume that a single representative …rm
operates within each country.
3.3 Endowments and Preferences
Households value consumption and leisure over the life cycle fcj;1¡ljgaccording
to a standard time-separable utility function
E
8
<
:
J X
j=0
¯
ju(cj;1¡ lj)
9
=
;
;
where ¯ is the raw time discount factor and expectations are taken over idio-
syncratic mortality shocks and stochastic labor productivity. In particular, the
expectations operator E encompasses the survival probabilities st;j;i:
Households are heterogenous with respect to age, a deterministic earnings
potential and stochastic labor productivity. These sources of heterogeneity a¤ect
a household’s labor productivity which is given by
µk"j´:
First, households labor productivity di¤ers according to their age: "j denotes
average age-speci…c productivity of cohort j. Second, each household belongs
to a particular group k 2 f1;:::;Kg that shares the same average productivity
13µk. Di¤erences in groups stand in for di¤erences in education or ability, char-
acteristics that are …xed at entry into the labor market and a¤ect a group’s
relative wage. We introduce these di¤erences in order to generate part of the
cross-sectional income and thus wealth dispersion that does not come from our
last source of heterogeneity, idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Lastly, a house-
hold’s labor productivity is a¤ected by an idiosyncratic shock, ´ 2 f1;:::;Eg
that follows a time-invariant Markov chain with transition probabilities
¼(´
0j´) > 0:
We denote by ¦ the unique invariant distribution associated with ¼.
3.4 Government Policies
The government collects assets of households that die before age J and redis-
tributes them in a lump-sum fashion among the citizens of the country as ac-
cidental bequests, ht;i (inheritances). Furthermore, we explore how our results
are a¤ected by the presence and the design of a pure pay-as-you-go public pen-
sion system, whose taxes and bene…ts have to be adjusted to the demographic
changes in each country. The social security system is modelled as follows. On
the revenue side, households pay a ‡at payroll tax rate ¿t;i on their labor earn-
ings. Retired households receive bene…ts, bt;k;i, that are assumed to depend
on the household type, µk, but are independent of the history of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. Pension bene…ts are therefore given by
bt;k;i = ½t;iµk(1 ¡ ¿t;i)wt;i; (15)
where ½t;i is the pension system’s net replacement rate.
We assume that the budget of the pension system is balanced at all times
such that taxes and bene…ts are related by
¿ t;iwt;iLt;i =
X
k
bt;k;i
X
j¸jr
Nt;j;k;i; (16)
where Nt;j;k;i denotes the population in country i at time t of age j and type k.
In our results section we distinguish between three di¤erent scenarios for the
future evolution of the social security system, one in which taxes are held con-
stant and replacement rates adjust accordingly, and vice versa. A third scenario
models an increase in the retirement age (and in addition adjusts bene…ts, if
needed, to assure budget balance). The results from the simple model above
suggests that our results will be signi…cantly a¤ected by the modelling choice
for social security.
3.5 Market Structure
In each period there are spot markets for the consumption good, for labor and
for capital services. While the labor market is a national market where labor
14demand and labor supply are equalized country by country, the markets for the
consumption good and capital services are international where goods and capital
‡ow freely, and without any transaction costs, between countries. The supply of
capital for production stems from households in all countries who purchase these
assets in order to save for retirement and to smooth idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. As sensitivity analysis, we explore how countries would be a¤ected by
their demographic changes if they were closed economies where capital stocks
and accumulated assets coincide by de…nition.
3.6 Equilibrium
Individual households, at the beginning of period t are indexed by their age j,
their group k, their country of origin i, their idiosyncratic productivity chock ´,
and their asset holdings a. Thus their maximization problem reads as
W (t;j;k;i;´;a) (17)
= max
c;a0;1¡l
fu(c;1¡ l) + ¯st;j;i
X
´0
¼(´0j´)W (t + 1;j + 1;k;i;´0;a0)g
s.t. c + a
0 =
(
(1 ¡ ¿ t;i)wt;iµk"j´l + (1 + rt)(a + ht;i) for j < jr
bt;k;i + (1 + rt)(a + ht;i) for j ¸ jr
a0;c ¸ 0 and l 2 [0;1]¢
Here wt;i is the wage rate per e¢ciency unit of labor and rt is the real interest
rate. We denote the cross-sectional measure of households in country i at time
t by ©t;i. We can then de…ne a competitive equilibrium as follows.
De…nition 1 Given initial capital stocks and measures fK0;i;©0;igi2I, a com-
petitive equilibrium are sequences of individual functions for the household, fW (t;¢);c(t;¢);l(t;¢);a0(t;¢)g
sequences of production plans for …rms fLt;i;Kt;ig1
t=0;i2I; policies f¿t;i;½t;i;bt;ig1
t=0;i2I;
prices fwt;i;rtg1
t=0;i2I, transfers fht;ig1
t=0;i2I and measures f©t;ig1
t=0;i2I such
that
1. Given prices, transfers and initial conditions, W (t;¢) solves equation (17);
and c(t;¢);l(t;¢);a0(t;¢) are the associated policy functions.
2. Interest rates and wages satisfy
rt = ®Zi
µ
Kt;i
AtLt;i
¶®¡1
¡ ±
wt;i = (1 ¡ ®)ZiAt
µ
Kt;i
AtLt;i
¶®
:
3. Transfers are given by
ht+1;i =
R
(1 ¡ st;j;i)a0(t;j;k;i;´;a)©t;i(dj £ dk £ d´ £ da)
R
©t+1;i(dj £ dk £ d´ £ da)
(18)
154. Government policies satisfy (15) and (16) in every period.
5. Markets clear in all t;i
Lt;i =
Z
µk"j´l(t;j;k;i;´;a)©t;i(dj £ dk £ d´ £ da) for all i
I X
i=1
Kt+1;i =
I X
i=1
Z
a0(t;j;k;i;´;a)©t;i(dj £ dk £ d´ £ da) for all i
I X
i=1
Z
c(t;j;k;i;´;a)©t;i(dj £ dk £ d´ £ da) +
I X
i=1
Kt+1;i
=
I X
i=1
At;iK
®
t;iL
1¡®
t;i + (1¡ ±)
I X
i=1
Kt;i for all i:
6. The cross-sectional measures ©t;i evolve as
©t+1;i(J £K£E£A) =
Z
Pt;i((j;k;´;a);J £K£E£A)©t;i(dj£dk£d´£da)
for all sets, J; K; E; A, where the Markov transition functions Pt;i are
given by
Pt;i((j;k;´;a);J£K£E£A) =
8
<
:
¼(´;E)st;j;i
if a0(t;j;k;i;´;a) 2 A
k 2 K;j + 1 2 J
0 else
and for newborns
©t+1;i(f1g£ K £ E £ A) = Nt+1;0;i ¢
½
¦(E) if 0 2 A
0 else
:
De…nition 2 A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which all
individual functions are constant over time and all aggregate variables grow at
a constant rate.
3.7 Thought Experiment and Computation
We take as exogenous driving process a time-varying demographic structure in
all regions under consideration. We allow country-speci…c survival, fertility and
migration rates to change over time, inducing a demographic transition from
an initial distribution towards a …nal steady state population distribution that
arises once all changes in these rates have been completed and the population
structure has settled down to its new steady state. Induced by this transition
of the population structure is a transition path of the economies of the model,
both in terms of aggregate variables as well as cross-sectional distributions of
wealth and welfare. Summary measures of these changes will provide us with
16answers as to how the changes in the demographic structure of the economy, by
changing returns to capital and wages, impact the distribution of welfare.
We start computations in year 1950 assumingan arti…cialinitialsteady state.
We then use data for a calibration period, 1950-2004, to determine several struc-
tural model parameters (see section 4). We then compute the model equilibrium
from 1950 to 2300 (when the new steady state is assumed and veri…ed to be
reached) and report simulation results for the main projection period of inter-
est, from 2005 to 2080. For given structural model parameters we solve for
the equilibrium using a modi…cation of the familiar Gauss-Seidel algorithm (see
Ludwig, 2006). Throughout we take as length of the period one year. Appendix
B contains a detailed description of our computational procedure.
4 Calibration
In this section we discuss our speci…cation of the model parameters. We need to
choose parameters governing the demographic transition, the production tech-
nology, endowments and preferences, and the social security policy.
4.1 Demographics
Our demographic processes are based on the United Nations world population
projections (United Nations, 2001). These numbers determine both the idiosyn-
cratic survival probabilities as well as the relative sizes of total populations in
the regions in all time periods under consideration. Figures 1 and 2 in the intro-
duction summarized the main stylized facts from these population …gures, and
appendix A describes in detail the methodology underlying our demographic
projections.
4.2 Technology
We restrict the capital share parameter, ®, the growth rate of labor produc-
tivity, g, and the depreciation rate, ±, to be constant across all regions under
consideration, whereas we allow technology levels Zi to di¤er across regions.
The parameters characterizing production technologies in di¤erent countries
can therefore be collected as
~ ªPS = [®;g;±;Z1;Z2;Z3]
0:
We estimate parameters ®;g and ± using U.S. NIPA data for a sample period
of 1960-2004, set Z1 = 1 and estimate Z2;Z3 taking data on relative labor
productivity across regions. A more detailed description of our approach is
given in appendix B.3. Table I summarizes the resulting parameter estimates.
17Table I: Technology Parameters
Parameter U.S. EU ROECD
Capital Share ® 0:33
Growth Rate of Technology g 0:018
Depreciation Rate ± 0:04
Total Factor Productivity Zi 1:0 0:88 0:65
4.3 Endowments and Preferences
Households start their life with zero assets and are endowed with one unit of time
per period. Labor productivity is given by the product of three components,
a deterministic age component "j, a deterministic group component µk and a
stochastic idiosyncratic component ´:
The age-productivity pro…le f"jgJ
j=1 is taken from Hansen (1993) and gener-
ates an average life-cycle wage pro…le consistent with U.S. data. In experiments
where we extend the retirement age we linearly extrapolate the e¢ciency pro…le
beyond age 65:
Conditional on age, the natural logarithm of wages is given by
log(µk) + log(´):
We choose the number of groups to be K = 2 and let groups be of equal size.
We choose fµ1;µ2g such that average-group productivity is equal to 1 and the
variance of implied labor incomes of entrants to the labor market coincides
with that reported by Storesletten et al. (2004). This requires µ1 = 0:57 and
µ2 = 1:43: For the idiosyncratic part of labor productivity we use a 2 state
Markov chain with annual persistence of 0:98 and implied conditional variance
of 8%, again motivated by the …ndings of Storesletten et al. (2004).
We assume that the period utility function is of the familiar CRRA form
given by
u(c;l) =
1
1 ¡ ¾
¡
c!i(1¡ l)1¡! i¢1¡¾
;
where ¾ denotes the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion and where !i measures
the importance of consumption, relative to leisure in each country. Di¤erences in
!i across countries allow us to match simulated hours worked to the actual data
separately for each country. In addition we have to specify the time discount
factor of households which we restrict to be identical across countries.
The preference parameters can accordingly be summarized as
~ ª
HS = [¾;¯;!1;!2;!3]
0 :
We assume ¾ = 1 such that utility is separable between consumption and leisure,
and determine the value of the discount rate by matching the average simulated
capital-output ratio to U.S. data for the period 1960-2004. The consumption
share parameters !i are estimated by matching simulated average hours worked
in the regions of our model to the data. A more detailed description of our
18methodology is given in appendix B.3. Table II summarizes the preference
parameters for the version of our model where a pension system is present.5
Table II: Preference Parameters
Parameter U.S. EU ROECD
Coe¢cient of RRA ¾ 1:0
Time Discount Factor ¯ 0:9378
Consumption Share Parameter !i 0:463 0:446 0:442
4.4 Social Security System
Our benchmark model contains no social security system. The version of the
model used most prominently in our welfare calculations contains the PAYGO
social security system, uses historical data for social security tax rates in the
three regions of interest until 2004 and then freezes future contribution rates at
their 2004 levels. Bene…ts adjust to achieve budget balance. In the alternative
scenario of …xed replacement rates we again use historical region-speci…c data
on contribution rates to back out constructed replacement rates until 2004 and
then …x replacement rates in the future to their 2004 values. Tax rates increase
to assure budget balance of the social security system.
Data for calibrating the social security system are taken from various sources.
For the U.S., we calculate social security contribution rates from NIPA data
taken from the BEA (Table 3.6). It is more di¢cult to obtain data for the other
world regions. We proxy the time path of social security contribution rates by
using time path information on total labor costs taken from the BLS and scale
these data by social security contribution rates from the OECD for the other
regions of interest.
5 Results for the Benchmark Model
In order to isolate the direct e¤ects of demographic changes on returns to capital,
international capital ‡ows, and the distribution of wealth and welfare we …rst
abstract from social security. In section 5.5 we then quantify the additional
e¤ects that are implied by the adjustments of social security parameters to
demographic change. In the benchmark scenario we also assume that capital
‡ows freely only between regions in the OECD, and we document in section 6.1
how our results are a¤ected if these regions would be closed economies.
5.1 Steady State Comparison
In order to obtain …rst sense for the impact of changes in demographics on the
economy, table III compares the main economic aggregates between the initial
5For each alternative version of our model all household model parameters are recalibrated
to match the same aggregate data described above. Estimated parameter values for these
alternative versions are similar to those reported in table II.
19steady state in 1950 and the …nal steady state in 2300. Here ¹ l denotes average
hours worked per person in working age. The table, which displays percentage
changes between the new and the old steady state (for the interest rate and
average hours percentage point di¤erences are shown), documents a substantial
decline in real rates of return between the old steady state in 1950 and the new
steady state in 2300 by more than 300 basis points. Detrended real wages, on
the other hand, increase by 14%; resulting from substantial capital deepening.
These …ndings are exactly what our simple model led us to expect. As the
discussion of equation (7) in the analysis of the simple model already showed, the
long run consequences for output (income) per capita are less clear. On the one
hand, output per worker increases substantially (due to a shrinking population,
capital deepening and slightly increased age-speci…c labor supply shares), but,
on the other hand, the fraction of the population that works declines. Table III
demonstrates that detrended output per capita declines slightly in the long run,
suggesting that the aging e¤ect dominates the capital deepening e¤ect.6
Table III: Steady State Comparison
Variable United States Eur. Union Rest OECD
r ¡3:06% ¡3:06% ¡3:06%
w 14:1% 14:1% 14:1%
Y=N ¡2:23% ¡0:10% ¡5:8%
¹ l 5:4% 6:0% 4:1%
The e¤ects documented in table III incorporate the entire demographic tran-
sition. In our subsequent analysis we now zoom in on our main period of interest,
the next 75 years. Since only a part of the dramatic aging of the population
falls into this period we expect the same qualitative, but quantitatively smaller
e¤ects.
5.2 Dynamics of Aggregate Statistics
In …gure 3 we display the evolution of the real return to capital from 2000 to
2080: In the same …gure we plot, as a summary measure of the age structure of
the population, the fraction of the world adult population with age above 65 (by
assumption these agents are retired in our model); this statistic is one minus the
working age to population ratio. We observe that the rate of world-wide return
to capital is predicted to fall by almost 1 percentage point in the next 60 years
6Output per capita declines least for the EU in the long run since hours worked per person
decline least. This is duetothe assumption that in the long run, towards the new steady state,
fertility rates in the EU will rebound so that the decrease in working age to population ratios
is roughly the same in the US and the EU in the long run. In addition, working households
increase their hours by more in the EU, relative to the US since their initial steady state level
of labor supply is lower and thus they face lower marginal costs of working extra hours.
Since the rebound of fertility rates in the EU does not occur in the next 75 years and thus
working-age to population ratios decline much more strongly in the EU than in the US in the
next 80 years, the transition analysis will paint a di¤erent picture along this dimension.
20and then to settle down at that lower level. This is exactly what we would have
expected, given the qualitative results from the simple model in section 2, and
given the fact that so far we abstract from social security (reform).
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Figure 3: Evolution of World Interest Rates
Pre-tax wages are related to the interest rate by
wt;i = (1 ¡ ®)ZiAt
µ
®Zi
rt + ±
¶ ®
1¡®
and thus de-trended (by productivity growth) real wages follow exactly the
inverse path of interest rates, documented in …gure 3. These de-trended wages
are predicted to increase by roughly 4% between 2000 and 2080 in all regions
in our model.
In …gure 4 we plot the evolution of de-trended output per capita in the three
regions, normalized to 1 in the year 2000. Notice that “per capita” here refers to
the adult population aged 20 to 95. We observe substantial declines of 7¡ 13%
in the three regions. The decline is least pronounced in the U.S., since there the
decrease of the fraction of households in working age is more modest after 2030,
as we saw in …gure 2. During the transition period from 2005-80, the negative
e¤ects of decreasing working age to population ratios therefore dominate the
positive e¤ects on output per worker (see the discussion of equation (7) in the
analysis of the simple model).
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Figure 4: Evolution of GDP per Capita in 3 Regions
5.3 Quantifying International Capital Flows
In order to analyze the direction and size of international capital ‡ows we will
document the evolution of the net foreign asset position and the current account
of thecountries/regions under consideration. As in the simplemodel,the current
account is given by the change in the net foreign asset position and thus by the
di¤erence of country i’s saving and investment7
CAt;i = Ft+1;i ¡ Ft;i
= St;i ¡ It;i:
When reporting these statistics we always divide them by output Yt;i: We start
with investigating national saving and investment rates and then discuss implied
the current account and net foreign asset positions.
7Note that in a closed economy Ft;i = Ct;i = 0; and that in a balanced growth path of an
open economy CAt;i = g(At;i ¡Kt;i): Furthermore net asset positions and current accounts
evidently have to sum to 0 across regions:
?
i
Ft;i =
?
i
CAt;i = 0 for all t:
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Figure 5: Evolution of Net Saving Saving Rate in 3 Regions
The most direct e¤ect of an aging population is that labor, as a factor of
production, becomes scarce. As a result, for unchanged aggregate saving the
return to capital has to fall and gross wages have to rise. This is what we observe
in …gure 3. However, the decline in interest rates may reduce the incentives of
households to save, depending on the relative size of the income and substitution
e¤ect. In addition, as our simple model suggests, with the aging of society the
age composition of the population shifts towards older households, who are dis-
savers in our life cycle model. Consequently savings rates in all regions in our
model decline over time, as shown in …gure 5. For the next 20 years the fall
in savings rates is most pronounced for the U.S., because there, during this
time period, the large cohort of baby boomers moves into retirement. The same
is true for other regions of the world, albeit to a lesser degree on average8.
After the large cohort of baby boomers have left the economy (i.e. died) the
U.S. saving rate is predicted to rebound (in about 25 to 35 years) and then to
stabilize, whereas in the European Union and the rest of the OECD savings
rates continue to fall until about 2040 and then stabilize.
The other side of the medal (that is, of the current account) is the investment
8Notice that the evolution of demographic variables and the simulated time paths of savings
may di¤er substantially across the countries within each country block, see, e.g., Börsch-Supan
et al. (2005).
23behavior in the di¤erent regions. Given that savings rates decline globally due
to population aging investment rates have to do so as well on average, since the
world current account has to balance to 0: As the population ages and the labor
force declines it is optimal to reduce the capital stock with which these fewer
workers work. Thus investment rates fall.
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Figure 6: Evolution of Net Investment Rate in 3 Regions
Figure 6 demonstrates this fall for all regions, but also shows that the fall is
by far the least pronounced for the U.S. Furthermore, in the U.S., the investment
rate stops to fall by about 2020, roughly a decade earlier than its saving rate.
This is due to the fact that the fall in the working age to population ratio is
completed around that date in the U.S. On the other hand, in the EU and the
rest of the OECD this ratio continues to fall until 2035. Since capital-(e¤ective)
labor ratios have to be equalized, capital allocated to these regions has to fall
(relative to the U.S.) and so do investment rates in these regions.
Figure 7 shows a very clear deterioration of the current account of the U.S.
of about 2% of GDP that is expected to occur in the next 30 years, as capital
‡ows from the European Union and, with a slight time delay, from the rest of
the OECD, into the U.S. By 2040 this process is completed and the current
account of all countries returns to roughly 0 from that point on. The predicted
deterioration in the U.S. current account is due to an investment rate that falls
less than in other countries (since the population in the US ages slower and
24thus the labor force falls less) as well as a (temporary) sharp decline in the
U.S. savings rate in the next 20 years due to the gradual retirement of the baby
boomers (see again …gures 5 and 6).
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Figure 7: Evolution of the Current Account in 3 Regions
Finally …gure 8 shows the evolution of the net foreign asset position, relative
to GDP, in the three regions of our model. The European Union, as the oldest
region, has a positive net asset position and thus provides capital to both the
rest of the OECD and, increasingly, to the U.S.. As the U.S. current account
is strongly negative during the years 2020 and 2040, the U.S. net foreign asset
position reaches a trough of about ¡36% in about 2040. Thus the qualitative
results from the quantitative model are in line with the predictions of the simple
model, coupled with the level and dynamics of the working age to population
ratio in the di¤erent regions documented in …gure 2.
5.4 Distributional and Welfare Consequences of Demo-
graphic Change
In the previous sections we have documented substantial changes in factor prices
induced by the aging of the population, amounting to a decline of about 1
percentage point in real returns tocapitaland an increase in gross wages of about
252000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Year
F
/
Y
foreign assets ratio
 
 
US
European Union
Rest OECD
Figure 8: Evolution of the Net Foreign Asset Position in 3 Regions
4% in the next decades. In this section we want to quantify the distributional
and welfare e¤ects emanating from these changes.
5.4.1 Evolution of Inequality
In …gure 9 we display the evolution of income inequality over time in the three
regions. Income is composed of labor income (which later will include pension
income) and capital income as well as transfers from accidental bequests.
We observe a signi…cant increase in income inequality between 2000 and
2080; of about 5 points in the Gini coe¢cient for the EU and the ROECD
and 3.5 points in the U.S.. The reason for this increase is mainly a composi-
tional e¤ect. Retired households have signi…cantly lower income on average than
households in working age. The demographic transition towards more retired
households therefore is bound to increase inequality, especially in those regions
where the increase in the fraction of retired households among the population is
very pronounced. This explains the more modest increase in income inequality
in the U.S.. Note that consumption inequality follows income inequality trends
fairly closely in the three regions (and thus is not shown here), but increases
in consumption inequality are less pronounced. Also notice that the ordering
of countries in the …gure will be reversed once we add pension systems - then,
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Figure 9: Evolution of Income Inequality in 3 Regions
income will be least equally distributed in the U.S..
The fact that it is not a rise in capital income inequality that drives the in-
crease in total income inequality becomes clear when plotting wealth inequality
over time. There is no discernible increase in the same period; evidently the
same is true for capital income inequality since capital income is proportional
to wealth.
In contrast to income, wealth follows a hump-shaped pattern over the life
cycle (on average), with the elderly and the young being wealth-poor. Thus,
in contrast to income inequality, the aging of the population does not lead to
an increase in wealth inequality, since the demographic change increases the
fraction of the elderly, but reduces the fraction of the young. Consequently
income and wealth inequality do not follow the same trend over time, nor is the
ranking in inequality across regions the same for income and wealth.
We therefore conclude that the opposite general equilibrium e¤ects on wages
and interest rates have little impact on the income and wealth distribution across
generations.
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Figure 10: Evolution of Wealth Inequality in 3 Regions
5.4.2 Welfare Consequences of the Demographic Transition
A household’s welfare is a¤ected by two consequences of demographic change.
First, her lifetime utility changes because her own survival probabilities increase;
this is in part what triggers the aging of the population. Second, due to the
demographic transition she faces di¤erent factor prices and government transfers
and taxes (from the social security system and from accidental bequests) than
without changes in the demographic structure. Speci…cally, households face a
path of declining interest rates and increasing wages, relative to the situation
without a demographic transition.
We want to isolate the welfare consequences of the second e¤ect. For this we
compare lifetime utility of agents born and already alive in 2005 under twodi¤er-
ent scenarios. For both scenarios we …x a household’s individual survival prob-
abilities at their 2005 values; of course they fully retain their age-dependence.
Then we solve each household’s problem under two di¤erent assumptions about
factor prices (and later taxes/transfers, once we have introduced social security).
Let W(t;i;j;k;´;a) denote the lifetime utility of an agent at time t ¸ 2005 in
country i with individual characteristics (j;k;´;a) that faces the sequence of
equilibrium prices as documented in the previous section, but constant 2005
survival probabilities, and let W 2005(t;i;j;k;´;a) denote the lifetime utility of
28the same agent that faces prices and taxes/transfers that are held constant at
their 2005 value. Finally, denote by g(t;i;j;k;´;a) the percentage increase in
consumption that needs to be given to an agent (t;i;j;k;´;a) at each date and
contingency in her remaining lifetime (keeping labor supply allocations …xed)
at …xed prices to make her as well o¤ as under the situation with changing
prices.9 Positive numbers of g(t;i;j;k;´;a) thus indicate that households obtain
welfare gains from the general equilibrium e¤ects of the demographic changes,
negative numbers mean welfare losses. Of particular interest are the numbers
g(t = 56;i;j = 0;k;´;a = 0); that is, the welfare consequences for newborn
agents in 2005 (t = 56) (remember that newborns start their life with zero
assets).
Table IV documents these numbers for type 1 for the U.S., di¤erentiated by
their productivity shock ´. The results for type 2 are nearly identical.10
Table IV: Welfare Cons., US
Productivity ´ 1 Productivity ´2
0:9% 0:6%
We make several observations. First, newborn agents experience welfare
gains from changing factor prices and transfers induced by the demographic
transition. Apart from changing preferences through higher longevity (an ef-
fect we control for in our welfare calculations) the demographic transition sub-
stantially increases the real wage over time, reduces the interest rate and …rst
increases and then (after 2040) somewhat reduces transfers from accidental be-
quests. The e¤ect from changes in transfers is small, at least for newborns.
The dominating e¤ect for newborn agents is the substantial increase in wages,
partially because these agents have not yet accumulated assets and thus do not
su¤er from a loss of capital income on already accumulated …nancial wealth, in
contrast to older households. Of course, a lower interest rate makes it harder for
these households to accumulate assets for retirement. Since borrowing is ruled
out the decline in interest rates alone therefore has unambiguously negative
consequences for welfare.
Second, agents born with low productivity experience somewhat higher wel-
fare gains than agents that start their working life with high productivity. Low
productivity agents expect higher productivity in the future, and thus bene-
…t more strongly from the increasing wage pro…le induced by the demographic
9For the Cobb-Douglas utility speci…cation for ¾ 6= 1 the number g(t;i;j;k;´;a) can easily
be computed as
g(t;i;j;k;´;a) =
?
W(t;i;j;k;´;a)
W2005(t;i;j;k;´;a)
? 1
!i(1¡¾)
:
A similar expression holds for ¾ = 1:
10The welfare consequences are very similar for other countries and type k2: In fact, in
the benchmark model the only di¤erence across countries and types stems from accidental
bequests, which are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion and whose dynamics varies slightly
across countries. Since these transfers are small in magnitude, however, so are the cross-
country and cross-type di¤erences in welfare.
29transition than the currently highly productive, whose productivity is going to
fall in expectation.
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Figure 11:
Given that the welfare impact of changing factor prices constitutes a trade-
o¤ between increasing wages and falling returns to capital one would expect
that those members of society for whom labor income constitutes a smaller part
of (future) resources than capital income bene…t less from the demographic
transition. An advantage of our model with uninsurable idiosyncratic income
shocks and thus endogenous intra-cohort wealth heterogeneity is that it allows us
todocument how the welfare consequences are distributed across the population,
both across and within cohorts. Figure 11 plots the welfare gains for agents of
age 60 in 2005. These households have most of their working life behind them,
thus are fairly una¤ected by the wage changes, and simply experience lower
returns on their accumulated savings. We see that agents in this cohort su¤er
welfare losses which increase substantially by the amount of …nancial assets
they have already accumulated. To give a sense of how many agents there are
at di¤erent points in the asset distribution, the support of this distribution for
the 60 year old ranges roughly to a = 12 (about 19 times GDP per capita);
with median asset levels around 4 (10) times GDP per capita for the low ´ - low
(high) type agents and about 4:1 (10:8) times GDP per capita for the high ´ -
low (high) type agents. Overall, a fraction of 38 percent of agents economically
30alive in 2005 gain from the changing factor prices. These tend to be young
agents with little assets and currently low labor productivity.
5.5 The Role of Social Security (and its Reform)
So far, we completely abstracted from government policies. While it is not
obvious a priori what the interaction of demographic changes and public policies
is in general, it is abundantly clear from policy debates that at least one large
social program is strongly a¤ected by it: social security.
An idealized pay as you go public pension system can respond to an increase
in the share of pensioners in the population by (a combination of) at least three
ways: cutting bene…ts, increasing social security contribution rates or increasing
the retirement age. While a likely response will include all elements, we now
present results for the model with a PAYGO socialsecurity system that responds
to population aging by either holding tax rates …xed (and thus cutting bene…ts),
by holding replacement rates …xed (and thus raising taxes), or by increasing the
retirement age.11 Because of the strong in‡uence of a public pension system on
private savings behavior, we expect that these di¤erent reform scenarios may
have substantially di¤erent implications for the evolution of factor prices and
the size and direction of international capital ‡ows as well as the distribution
of welfare. This conjecture turns out to be correct. Note that for all exercises
we re-calibrate production and preference parameters such that each economy
(with the di¤erent social security systems) attains the same calibration targets
for the 1950 to 2004 period
In table V we show how the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates and
prices di¤ers across the various scenarios for social security. Comparing the
no-social security scenario to a world with social security in which payroll tax
rates are held constant (and thus bene…ts decline), we observe that changes
in factor prices are roughly the same between the two scenarios.12 One big
di¤erence, however, is the change in social security bene…ts required to cope
with the demographic transition, which implies a decline in replacement rates
by about 8 percentage points in the scenario with social security. Column 4
demonstrates that keeping pension bene…ts constant and adjusting taxes, on
the other hand, has dramatic consequences for the evolution of interest rates
and wages, relative to the benchmark scenario of …xing tax rates for social
security. With …xed bene…ts the incentives to save for retirement are drastically
reduced, relative to the benchmark. In addition, the substantial increase in
tax rates of 7 percentage points and the corresponding reduction in after tax
wages makes it harder to save. Therefore, despite the decline in the fraction of
households in working age (and diminished incentives to work because of higher
payroll taxes) now the capital-labor ratio remains roughly unchanged, because
11In our experiment we increase the mandatory retirement age by 5 years in 2005, and keep
contribution rates …xed. When needed, bene…ts are adjusted to retain budget balance of the
social security system.
12Remember that we recalibrate our model so that in all scenarios the pre-2005 equilibrium
features the same capital-output ratio.
31of the large reduction of household savings. Consequently the increase in wages
and decline in returns is much less pronounced in this scenario. Finally, the
last column of table V shows that an increase in the retirement age by 5 years,
while leaving the change in factor prices roughly the same as in the benchmark,
implies a much smaller decline in bene…ts as with a retirement age of 65 (see
column 2).13 Because of the expansion in labor supply output per capita falls
signi…cantly less in this scenario than in all others.
Table V. Evolution of Aggregates in US, 2005-80
Var. No Soc.Sec. ¿ …xed ½ …xed Adj of jr
r ¡0:89% ¡0:86% ¡0:18% ¡0:87%
w 4:2% 4:1% 0:8% 4:0%
¿ 0% 0% 7:3% 0%
½ 0% ¡7:9% 0% ¡5:0%
Y=N ¡7:6% ¡7:2% ¡12:6% ¡5:7%
Given these substantial di¤erences in changes of allocations it is not surpris-
ing that the welfare consequences di¤er across these two scenarios as well. Table
VI summarizes the welfare losses from the demographic transition for newborns
in the U.S. in 2005.14 We …nd that, because of the decline in bene…ts or the
increase in taxes, the welfare implications from the demographic change are less
favorable in a world with social security than without. Especially the policy
option of keeping bene…ts constant and letting tax rates increase implies large
welfare losses from population aging for newborns, and even more so for future
generations (not shown here). If, in contrast, the retirement age is increased
to age 70, low-type households who enter the labor market unproductive are
especially bene…tting. These households expect productivity to be higher in
the future, face increasing wages and can exploit these longer now as they can
work until age 70. It is therefore this group for which the increase in wages
presents a good opportunity to inter-temporally substitute labor supply; con-
sequently the bene…t of being able to work longer and thus the overall welfare
gains from changing factor prices are largest for this group. For older agents the
welfare losses from the demographic transition are signi…cantly smaller with an
expansion of the retirement age, relative to simply holding contribution rates
…xed and let bene…ts decline (results not shown). First, the decline in bene…ts
is much smaller with an adjustment of the retirement age, and second, older
households are given the option to endogenously respond to lower bene…t levels
by expanding their labor supply for …ve more years.
13A further increase in the retirement age has no substantial e¤ect on labor supply since
households are not very productive beyond age 70and thus choose to voluntarily retire around
that age.
14Note that the numbers of table VI do permit a meaningful welfare comparison of di¤erent
social security reform scenarios to deal with the demographic change. In order to achieve
this comparability in our welfare computations (and in these only) we always use the same
parameters for all scenarios, those calibrated for the no social security benchmark.
The table does not, however, permit an assessment as to whether households are better o¤
in a world with or without social security.
32Table VI: Welfare Consequences, Newborns in U.S.
No Soc.Sec. ¿ Fixed ½ Fixed Change in jr
Type ´1 ´2 ´1 ´2 ´1 ´2 ´1 ´2
k1 0:9% 0:6% 0:8% 0:2% ¡1:6% ¡1:8% 1:4% 0:6%
k2 0:9% 0:6% 0:4% 0:0% ¡1:8% ¡1:9% 0:8% 0:3%
Thus we conclude that the option of increasing the retirement age leads to
less welfare losses (and even welfare gains for some groups) from population
aging than adjusting taxes or bene…ts alone.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we discuss how our results hinge on the assumption of the U.S.
being open to international capital ‡ows from (parts of) the rest of the world,
and we separately quantify the relative importance of changes in fertility and in
mortality rates. Throughout these exercises, we keep social security tax rates
and the retirement age constant and adjust bene…ts.
6.1 The Importance of Free International Capital Flows
Most analyses of the demographic transition and their allocative consequences
are carried out in a closed economy. We therefore want to quantify the impor-
tance of international capital ‡ows for the extent to which the return to capital
in the U.S. responds to a change in its demographic structure.15 In order to do
so we now show results derived under the assumption that the U.S. is a closed
economy, and thus the capital stock used in its production has to be equal to
total domestic asset accumulation. For an interpretation of these results it is
important to keep in mind that, as …gure 2 showed, the U.S. ages more slowly
than the EU and the rest of the OECD. We carry out the same experiment for
the rest of the OECD since that region is most rapidly aging in the 2005 to 2080
time period.16
Table VII: Evolution of Aggregates, 2005-2080
Var. US, Open US, Closed ROECD, Open ROECD, Closed
r ¡0:86% ¡0:79% ¡0:86% ¡1:03%
w 4:1% 3:7% 4:1% 5:0%
Y=N ¡7:2% ¡7:7% ¡12:6% ¡11:4%
15Since the rest of the world is aging at similar speed as the EU and the ROECD, repeating
our exercices by letting capital ‡ow freely also between the OECD and the rest of the world
yields results that are very similar to the ones reported here.
16Not surprisingly the results for the EU lie in between those for the U.S. and those for the
ROECD, given that the EU ages faster than the U.S., but slower than the ROECD.
33Table VII shows that the U.S. imports the more pronounced population
aging from the EU and the ROECD, in the sense that it experiences a more
severe decline in rates of return in the U.S. as open economy, compared to as
closed economy. Evidently wages follow the reverse pattern. Output per capita
falls less in the open economy because both labor input and capital used in U.S.
production decline by less between 2005 and 2080 than in the closed economy.
For capital, another way of stating this fact is that in the closed economy the
net foreign asset position of the U.S. is constant over time (and equal to zero),
whereas in the open economy it is declining over time, as more capital is ‡owing
into the U.S. (or less savings out of it) in 2080 than in 2005: For the rest of the
OECD the pattern is exactly the reverse, and the e¤ects are somewhat more
sizeable. This region, being the fastest aging in the OECD, would experience
a substantially bigger fall in rates of return (and substantially larger increase
in real wages) as a closed economy. Measured by the decline in the return
to capital, the U.S. therefore imports some of the e¤ects of more pronounced
aging of the population in Europe and the rest of the OECD, while the ROECD
exports it into the EU and especially into the U.S..
How are the welfare implications of the demographic change impacted by the
degree of openness to international capital ‡ows? Table VIII demonstrates that
for the U.S. the welfare implications of population aging are hardly a¤ected by
whether it is an open or a closed economy.17 In the ROECD, on the other hand,
newborns have signi…cantly higher welfare gains in the closed, compared to the
open economy, because in the former case the increase in wages is substantially
stronger than in the latter.18
Table VIII: Welfare Consequences, Newborns in U.S., ROECD
US, Open US, Closed ROECD, Open ROECD, Closed
Type ´1 ´2 ´1 ´2 ´1 ´2 ´1 ´2
k1 0:8% 0:2% 0:9% 0:3% 0:1% ¡0:3% 0:6% 0:0%
k2 0:4% 0:0% 0:4% 0:0% ¡0:2% ¡0:5% 0:1% ¡0:3%
6.2 Decomposing the E¤ects of Changes in Fertility and
Mortality
The demographic transition is caused both by changes in fertility and mortality
rates. In this section we decompose our results into the part that is due to the
decline in mortality rates and the part that is due to a decline in fertility rates.
In order to carry out such a decomposition we have to keep in mind that in
2005 the population of our economy is not stationary, and thus changes in its
17The slighty better welfare implications for the closed economy stem from astronger initial
increase in accidental bequests, compared to the open economy, which more than o¤sets the
lesser increase in real wages. Overall the welfare di¤erences between the two cases are very
small, however.
18However, since the decline in interest rates is much more pronounced in the closed
ROECD, older generations with large amounts of accumulated assets su¤er bigger welfare
gains in the closed, relative to the open economy scenario in the ROCED.
34structure would occur even when mortality and fertility rates are held constant
at their 2005 values.
In order to account for these changes we …rst compute the consequences
from population aging assuming that mortality and fertility rates stay constant
at their 2005 levels. By this, we isolate the impact of the population dynam-
ics stemming from the nonstationary population structure in 2005. We then
in addition let either mortality or fertility rates change in accordance with UN
predictions and report the incremental change (over and above the pure pop-
ulation dynamics) induced by the change in either mortality or fertility rates.
Absent strong interaction e¤ects the changes observed in the benchmark model
are then the sum of the pure population dynamics e¤ect, the incremental ef-
fect from changes in fertility rates and the incremental e¤ect from changes in
mortality rates.
Table IX provides the outcome of this decomposition exercise and shows that
the main sources of changes in factor prices and other aggregates between 2005
and 2080, at least in the U.S., come from changes in mortality rates (column 4
of table IX), and from the fact that past fertility and mortality rates have led to
a population structure that would imply an aging U.S. even absent any further
changes in fertility and mortality rates (column 2). In fact, since for the U.S.
fertility rates (including migration rates) are predicted to increase slightly in
the near future, the e¤ect from only changing fertility rates is to make the U.S.
younger (see column 3). We also observe that indeed the consequences of the
demographic change can be almost perfectly be linearly dissected into to a pure
composition e¤ect, a fertility rate e¤ect and a mortality rate e¤ect, as columns
2-4 roughly sum to column 5, our benchmark results documented in section 5.
Table IX also shows that future predicted changes in fertility and mortality
rates have substantially di¤erent impacts on interest rates r and savings rates
sr. The strong decline in mortality rates alone makes people live longer and
thus forces them to save more, but on the other hand shifts the population
towards older cohorts (which tend to be dis-savers). On net, the savings rate
increases slightly. Since the fraction of the population in working age declines
substantially (see the change in wapr in column 4), the capital-labor ratio in-
creases, and with it wages; the rate of return falls as a consequence of declining
mortality rates. In contrast, while an increase in fertility also increases the sav-
ings rate (since it shifts the population towards those that save, rather than
dis-save), it also increases aggregate labor supply by enlarging the labor force.
Thus the change in fertility rates alone reduces the capital-labor ratio and thus
raises interest rates and reduces real wages.
35Table IX: Evolution of Aggregates in the U.S., 2005-2080
Var. Only Comp. Only ¢ Fertility Only ¢ Mortality Benchmark
wapr ¡8:4% 0:8% ¡4:2% ¡12:2%
sr ¡3:1% 0:7% 0:2% ¡2:5%
r ¡0:45% 0:18% ¡0:66% ¡0:86%
w 2:0% ¡0:8% 2:8% 4:1%
½ ¡6:3% 0:4% ¡1:8% ¡7:9%
Y=N ¡6:0% ¡0:3% ¡0:7% ¡7:2%
Overall, while predicted future changes in fertility rates are small and thus
do not a¤ect aggregates between 2005 and 2080 substantially, the large decline
in mortality rates predicted for the near future explains a substantial part of
the increase in wages and the reduction of real interest rates, and thus, not
surprisingly, a substantial part of the welfare consequences from population
aging documented above.
7 Conclusions
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, bringing with it
a potentially large impact on the returns to the production factors capital and
labor. This paper documents that the welfare consequences from the increase in
wages and declines in rates of return can be substantial, in the order of up to 1%
in lifetime consumption for newborns in 2005. These welfare gains for newborns
however only come along if social security contribution rates are held constant
at current levels. Households that have already accumulated assets, on the
other hand, lose from the decline in rates of return. Increasing the mandatory
retirement age by …ve years is shown to substantially mitigate these losses and
to signi…cantly increase welfare gains of newborns.
The welfare gains for newborns (and losses for older generations) we doc-
ument have to be added to (or traded o¤ against) the potential welfare gains
from a longer (and healthier) life that is part of the source of the aging of the
population in industrialized countries. While quantifying these welfare gains is
beyond the scope of the current paper, our results indicate that overall living
longer is likely to be a good thing for most households, at least if social security
tax rates are not increased to keep bene…ts constant at current levels.
Another potentially bene…cial side e¤ect of a shrinking population (or a
less rapidly growing population) that we have abstracted from and that may
further enhance these welfare gains emanates from a reduction in the price of
housing, assuming a supply that is at least somewhat inelastic. Since a serious
quantitative evaluation of this e¤ect requires an appropriate model of housing
(choice) and thus the need of adding a continuous state variable to our model,
carrying out such an analysis is beyond the scope of current computational
feasibility.
Finally, one important channel of adjustment to a shrinking labor force that
we have abstracted from is endogenous human capital accumulation. Higher
36returns to human capital in the form of higher wages may make it optimal for
young (and possibly older) households to obtain a better education, increasing
the supply of e¤ective labor. This e¤ect may counteract some of the increase
in the capital-labor ratio and hence mitigate the impact of population aging
on factor prices. A quantitative exploration of this channel in a world with an
aging population is left for future research.
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38A Details of the Demographic Projections
For each country i 2 f1;:::;Ig we base our demographic data on the o¢cial de-
mographic data and projections by the United Nations (United Nations, 2002).
Starting from a given initial age-distribution of population, N0;¹ j;i, in year 1950
for actual age ¹ j 2 f0;:::;96g demography in each year t is given recursively by
Nt+1;¹ j+1;i = Nt;¹ j;i(st;¹ j;i + mt;¹ j;i); mt;¹ j;i = 0 for ¹ j > 20
Nt+1;0;i =
50 X
¹ j=15
ft;¹ j;iNt;¹ j;i
where mt;¹ j;i(ft;¹ j;i) denotes time, age and country speci…c migration (fertility)
rates. Our assumption, that migration rates are zero for ages above 20 allows us
to treat newborns and immigrants in the economic model alike, compare Section
3.1.
The United Nations provide demographic data on Nt;¹ j;i, st;¹ j;i and ft;¹ j;i on
an annual basis for the years 1950-2050, but for age-groups of …ve only. We
interpolate the initial distribution of the population, N1950;¹ j;i, and the data
on st;¹ j;i and ft; ¹ j;i for all t 2 f1950;:::;2050g between age-groups to get age-
speci…c data. As for migration we use the UN data on aggregate migration,
Mt;i, and assume that migration numbers are equally distributed across ages for
¹ j 2 f0;:::;20g. These approximations result in a decent …t of our demographic
model to the o¢cial aggregate UN …gures.
We further forecast demography beyond the UN forecasting horizon un-
til 2300. First, while holding fertility rates constant, we assume that life-
expectancy continues to increase at constant rates until year 2100. We then
hold age-speci…c survival rates constant and assume that fertility rates adjust
such that the number of newborns is constant in each successive year until
2200. This adjustment procedure implies that stationary population numbers
are reached in year 2200. To support the steady state in our economic model,
we hold demography constant for an additional 100 years until 2300.
B Computational Details
B.1 Household Problem
The idea is to iterate on the Euler equation, using ideas developed in Carroll
(2005). The dynamic programming problem of the household reads as
W (t;j;k;i;´;a) (19)
= max
c;a0;1¡l
fu(c;1¡ l) + ¯st;j;i
X
´0
¼(´
0j´)W (t + 1;j + 1;k;i;´
0;a
0)g
s.t. c + a0 =
(
(1 ¡ ¿ t;i)wt;iµk"j´l + (1 + rt)(a + ht;i) for j < jr
bt;j;k;i + (1 + rt)(a + ht;i) for j ¸ jr
a0;c ¸ 0 and l 2 [0;1]
39where t indexes time, j indexes age, k indexes type, i indexes country, ´ denotes
the idiosyncratic income shock and a denotes asset holdings.
Following Deaton (1991), we denote by x “cash-on-hand” as the amount of
resources available if l = 1,
x =
(
(1¡ ¿t;i)wt;iµk"j´ + (1 + rt)(a + ht;i) for j < jr
bt;j;k;i + (1+ rt)(a + ht;i) for j ¸ jr
Now, rewrite the Bellman equation as
V(t;j;k;;i´;x)
= max
c;1¡l
fu(c;1¡ l) + ¯st;j;i ¢
X
´0
¼(´0j´)V (t + 1;j + 1;k;i;´0;(1 + rt+1)(x ¡ e) + y0)g;
where
e =
(
c+ wt;i(1¡ ¿t;i)µk"j´(1 ¡ l) for j < jr
c for j ¸ jr
and
y0 =
(
wt+1;i(1 ¡ ¿t+1;i)µk"j+1´0 + (1 + rt+1)ht+1;i for j < jr
bt+1;j+1;k;i + (1 + rt+1)ht+1;i for j ¸ jr
The resulting inter-temporal Euler equation for consumption reads as
uc ¸ ¯st;j;i(1+ rt+1)
X
´0
¼(´0j´)Vx0(t+ 1;j + 1;k;i;´0;x0)
= if a0 > 0 (20)
and the inter-temporal Euler equation for leisure as
u1¡l ¸ ¯st;j;i(1 + rt+1)
X
´0
¼(´
0j´)Vx0(t + 1;j + 1;k;i;´
0;x
0)wt;i(1 ¡ ¿t;i)µk"j´
= if l > 0 (21)
and the envelope condition reads as
Vx(t;j;k;i;´;x) = u
0(c) (22)
We can therefore de…ne the intra-temporal Euler equation between consump-
tion and leisure as
u1¡l ¸ ucwt;i(1¡ ¿t;i)µk"j´
= if l > 0 and a0 > 0 (23)
40from which, for the family of Cobb-Douglas utility functions, we can get an
explicit solution for leisure in terms of consumption and wages as
1 ¡ l = 1 ¡ l(c;wt;i(1¡ ¿ t;i)µk"j´)
if l > 0 and a
0 > 0 (24)
Our algorithm operates on (20), (22) and (24).
1. De…ne a type-independent grid for savings
GA = f0;a2;:::;anag
2. De…ne a type-dependent grid on x for the last generation
GS
J;k = fx1;k;x1;k;:::;xnx;kg
While GS
J;k is type dependent we drop the dependence on k from here on to
simplify notation. Choose xnx > ana as the maximum possible realization
of cash on hand and x1 = xmin > 0 as the minimum possible realization
of cash on hand. Furthermore let nx = na + 1:
3. From economic theory it follows that
c(t;J;k;i;´;x) = x
l(t;J;k;i;´;x) = 0
a
0(t;J;k;i;´;x) = 0
for all x 2 GS
J;k: From (22)
V
0
x0(t;J;k;i;´;x) = u
0
c(t;J;k;i;´;x)
Vx(t;J;k;i;´;x) = uc(t;J;k;i;´;x):
4. Now iterate on j; j = nj ¡ 1;:::;1: Given that the function V 0
x0(t+ 1;j +
1;k;i;´;x) is known from the previous step, do the following
(a) For all a0 2 GA, solve equation (20) for c using equation (24) for
numbers (c1;:::;cna): Since
x0 = 2 GS
j+1;k
in general, this involves interpolation of the function V . For reasons
of accuracy, we follow the suggestions of Carroll (2005) and interpo-
late on an appropriate transform of V 0 which is approximately linear.
(b) Equipped with the consumption numbers, calculate leisure by solving
equation (24) for (l1;:::;lna):. If l < 0 then go back to (a) and
calculate consumption for l = 0.
41(c) Equipped with the consumption and leisure numbers, de…ne the grid
GS
j;k by
x1 = xmin
xp+1 =
(
ap + cp + (1¡ lp)wt;i(1 ¡ ¿t;i)µk"j´ for j < jr
ap + cp + bt;j;k;i for j < jr
for p = 1;:::;na:
In general, x1 = xmin where xmin is the lowest possible realization
of cash on hand. If, however, xmin > x2 then replace x1 with any
number smaller than x2.
Calculate the consumption functions
c(t;j;k;i;´;x1) = x1
c(t;j;k;i;´;xp) = cp for p = 2;:::;nx
l(t;j;k;i;´;xp) = lp for p = 1;:::;nx
a(t;j;k;i;´;x1) = 0
a0(t;j;k;i;´;xp+1) = ap for p = 1;:::;na
(d) Update for all x 2 GS
j;k
Vx(t;j;k;i;´;x)
= uc(c(t;j;k;i;´;x);1¡ l(t;j;k;i;´;x))
V (t;j;k;i;´;x)
= u(c(t;j;k;i;´;x);1 ¡ l(t;j;k;i;´;x)) + ¯st;j;i
X
´0
¼(´0j´)V(t + 1;j + 1;k;i;´0;x0)
The updating of the value function again involves interpolation.
B.2 The Aggregate Model
For a given r £ 1 vector ~ ª of structural model parameters, we …rst solve for an
“arti…cial” initial steady state in period t = 0 which gives an initial distribution
of assets. We thereby presume that households assume prices toremain constant
for all periods t 2 f0;:::;Tg and are then surprised by the actual price changes
induced by the transitional dynamics. Next, we solve for the …nal steady state
of our model which is reached in period T and supported by our demographic
projections, see appendix A. For both steady states, we solve for the equilibrium
of the aggregate model by iterating on the m£1 steady state price vector ~ Pss =
[p1;:::;pm]
0. p1 is the world marginal product of capital, rt + ±, p2;:::;pI+1
are social security contribution (or replacement) rates of each country, ¿ t;i(½t;i),
and pI+2;:::;p2I+1 are accidental bequests (as a ratio of wages) in each country,
42ht;i
wt;i. Notice that all elements of ~ Pss are de…ned such that they are constant in
the steady states.
Solution for the steady states of the model involves the following steps:
1. In iteration q for guess ~ P q
ss solve the household problem.
2. Next aggregate across all households in all countries to get the world-
wide aggregate capital stock,
P
iKt;i. De…ne by ·t;i the capital stock per
e¢ciency unit in country i,
·t;i =
Kt;i
Z
1=(1¡®)
i AtLt;i
= ·t 8i;
which is constant across all countries by our assumption of perfect capital
mobility and the market market clearing condition for the world interest
rate, rt + ± = ®·®¡1
t . It follows that
X
i
Kt;i = ·t
X
i
Z
1=(1¡®)
i AtLt;i:
We use this condition to form an update of the world marginal product of
capital, ~ p1.
3. Aggregate across allhouseholds to get aggregate labor supply in each coun-
try, Lt;i. Update social security contributions (or replacement rates) using
the social security budget constraint, equation (16). Calculate bequests
in each country by equation (18).
4. Collect the updated variables in
~ ~ Pss and notice that
~ ~ Pss = H(~ Pss), where
H is a vector-valued non-linear function.
5. De…ne the root-…nding problem G(~ Pss) = ~ Pss ¡ H(~ Pss), where G is a
vector-valued non-linear function, and iterate on ~ Pss until convergence.
We use Broyden’s method to solve the problem and denote the …nal ap-
proximate Jacobi matrix by Bss.
Next, we solve for the transitional dynamics by the following steps:
1. Use the steady state solutions to form a linear interpolation to get the
starting values for the m(T ¡ 2) £ 1 vector of equilibrium prices, ~ P =
[~ p0
1;:::;~ p0
m]
0, where pi;i = 1;:::;m are vectors of length (T ¡ 2) £ 1.
2. In iteration q for guess ~ P q solve the household problem. We do so by
iterating backwards in time for t = T ¡ 1;:::;2 to get the decision rules
and forward for t = 2;:::;T ¡ 1 for aggregation.
3. Update variables as in the steady state solutions and denote by ~ ~ P = H(~ P)
the m(T ¡ 2) £ 1 vector of updated variables.
434. De…ne the root-…ndingproblem as G(~ P ) = ~ P¡H(~ P ). Since T is large, this
problem is substantially larger and we use the Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton
algorithm suggested in Ludwig (2006) to form and update guesses of an
approximate Jacobi matrix of the system of m(T¡2) non-linear equations.
B.3 Calibration of Structural Model Parameters
Calibration of structural model parameters is based on a procedure suggested
in Ludwig (2005). We split the r £ 1 vector of structural model parameters,
~ ª, as ~ ª =
h
(~ ªe)0;(~ ªf)0
i0
. ~ ªf is a vector of predetermined (…xed) parameters,
whereas the e £ 1 vector ~ ªe is estimated by minimum distance (unconditional
matching of moments using e moment conditions). Denote by
ut(~ ªe) = yt ¡ f(~ ªe) for t = 0;:::;T0
the GMM error as the distance between data, yt, and model simulated (pre-
dicted) values, f(~ ªe).
Under the assumption that the model is correctly speci…ed, the restrictions
on the GMM error can be written as
E[ut(~ ª
e
0)] = 0;
where ~ ªe
0 denotes the vector of true values. Denote sample averages of ut as
gT0(~ ªe) ´
1
T0 + 1
T0 X
t=0
ut(~ ªe): (25)
We estimate the elements of ~ ªe by setting these sample averages to zero (up to
some tolerance level).
In our economic model, the vector ~ ªe is given by
~ ªe = [g;±;®;Zi;:::;ZI;¯;!i;:::;!I]
0 :
We estimate the structural model parameters using data from various sources
for the period 1960;:::;2004, hence T0 = 44. To identify the parameters of
the production function, g;±;®, we use NIPA data for the U.S. on GDP, …xed
assets, depreciation, wages and labor supply. Since our economic model restricts
the capital-output ratio to be equal across countries, we restrict Z1 = 1 and
estimate Zi for i > 1 using data on labor productivity of country i relative to the
U.S.. The remaining structural model parameters, ¯;!1;!2;!3 are estimated
by simulation. We estimate ¯ by setting to zero the average distance between
the simulated and the actual capital-output ratio and !1;!2;!3 by setting to
zero the average distance between simulated and actual average hours worked.
The predetermined parameter of our model is the coe¢cient of relative risk
aversion, ¾, which we set to one. In addition, we impose the restriction that the
parameters, ®;±;g;¯;¾, are constant across countries.
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